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RIAA V. VERIZON INTERNET SER VICES, INC.:
PEER-TO-PEER NETWORKING RENDERS
SECTION 512(H) SUBPOENAS UNDER THE
DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT
OBSOLETE
Thomas P. Owen, Jr. * & A. Benjamin Katz"
The advent of peer-to-peer technology, such as Napster, Kazaa, and
Morpheus, has created considerable consternation among copyright
owners, particularly within the music and motion picture industries. This
technology, popularized in 1999, was used to illegally download music and
movies online. Copyright owners attempted to curb this development by
suing the services, such as Napster, that allowed file sharing to prosper.'
Despite the legal success copyright owners have enjoyed in stopping
these services, the decentralized nature of peer-to-peer technology meant
copyright owners were winning the battles, but losing the war. Because
most instances of copyright infringement continued unabated, the music
recording industry then took the next step--suing individual users.2 After
months of gathering information about alleged infringers of copyrighted
music, the Recording Industry Association of America ("RIAA") filed
hundreds of suits against those who used peer-to-peer technology to
illegally download music.
3
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1. See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 284 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2002); A&M
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Ariana Eunjung Cha &
Paul Fahri, Media Titans Say Web Site Infringes on Copyrights, WASH. POST, July 21, 2000, at
El (discussing copyright infringement suit filed by the Motion Picture Association of America
("MPAA") against Scour.com, a site described as "Napster with movies").
2. See Mike Musgrove, RIAA Plans to Sue Music Swappers; No More Warnings to
Individuals, WASH. POST, June 26, 2003, at E l.
3. See Jonathan Krim & Frank Ahrens, Recording Industry Curbed on Music Suits, WASH.
POST, Dec. 20, 2003, at Al.
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Unlike the RIAA's earlier attempts to curb online piracy, this effort
appears to have been more successful. Many of those sued settled with the
RIAA, agreeing to pay restitution and to stop downloading music. 4 Others
signed up with the RIAA's "amnesty program," in which the RIAA agreed
not to pursue litigation if the infringers erased their illegal music files and
promised not to infringe in the future.5 Even more important, some have
linked the RIAA's lawsuits to the deletion of millions of music files on
personal computers and a downturn in the use of file sharing technology.6
So it appears that the RIAA's lawsuits against individual users positively
affected its online piracy problem.
But there is concern that a recent federal appellate decision may
undermine that success. In RIAA v. Verizon Internet Services, Inc., the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ("D.C.
Circuit") held that the subpoenas used by the RIAA to obtain the names
and physical addresses of those accused of illegally downloading music
could not be served upon Internet service providers ("ISPs") who merely
acted as passive transmitters of the allegedly infringing materials.7 This
included situations involving file sharing through peer-to-peer technology.
Thus, copyright owners have lost a mechanism for obtaining information
necessary to pursue individual users for copyright infringement.
Part I of this Article will provide a brief overview of peer-to-peer
technology and its emergence as a piracy tool. Part II will then look at the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act,8 specifically section 512(h),9 which
allows copyright owners to subpoena ISPs without filing suit. Part III will
review and analyze the district and appellate court opinions in the Verizon
case. Finally, Part IV will look at the effects and possible responses to the
Verizon decision, concluding that an alternative procedure for obtaining the
names and addresses of alleged infringers is sufficient to allow the RIAA to
continue to pursue individual users.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Mike Musgrove, RIAA Warnings, Lawsuits Pressed 'Delete' Key, WASH. POST, Nov. 9,
2003, at F7.
7. 351 F.3d 1229, 1233 (D.C. Cir. 2003) ("Verizon III'); see also In re: Verizon Internet
Servs., Inc., 240 F. Supp. 2d 24, 28-29 (D.D.C. 2003) ("Verizon I"); In re: Verizon Internet
Servs., Inc., 257 F. Supp. 2d 244, 247-48 (D.D.C. 2003) ("Verizon II1). For a description of an
Internet "service provider," see infra text accompanying notes 60-61.
8. Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
9. 17 U.S.C. § 512(h) (2000).
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I. COPYRIGHT OWNERS AND PEER-TO-PEER TECHNOLOGY
Peer-to-peer technology allows computer users to both provide and
obtain material from others users without the need for an intermediary
server.' 0 Peer-to-peer technology did not become popular until Shawn
Fanning created Napster in 1999.11 Napster allowed users to share music
files with one another using a centralized directory, although by using a
centralized directory, it was not true peer-to-peer software. 2 But it did
allow a user access to music files from other users without the need for that
material to be stored on the Internet. 13 Napster immediately became one of
the most popular online software programs ever, with over 70 million users
at its peak.
14
Unfortunately for the music recording industry, the most popular use
for Napster was to illegally download music files. Therefore, in September
1999, the RIAA sued Napster for copyright infringement and sought to
enjoin Napster from operating its site. 15 After years of litigation, the RIAA
succeeded in obtaining an injunction that required Napster to prevent
copyrighted material from being illegally swapped. 16  This proved to be
Napster's death knell, and by September 2002, it was no longer operating.
17
Despite the RIAA's success in eliminating Napster, the music industry has
failed to stop the widespread proliferation of illegal music downloads. 18 By
its own estimate, the music industry lost $5 billion in revenue in 2002 due
10. Damien A. Riehl, Peer-to-Peer Distribution Systems: Will Napster, Gnutella, and
Freenet Create a Copyright Nirvana or Gehenna?, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1761, 1765
(2001).
11. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Charismatic Code, Social Norms, and the Emergence of
Cooperation on the File-Swapping Networks, 89 VA. L. REV. 505, 511-13 (2003); see also Riehl,
supra note 10, at 1766-67. Peer-to-peer technology has technically been in existence since at
least 1969. Lisa J. Beyer Sims, Mutiny on the Net: Ridding P2P Pirates of Their Booty, 52
EMORY L.J. 1907, 1910 (2003). However, this technology was not readily accessible to average
users until Napster arrived in 1999. Id. To the extent it was available, there is no evidence that it
was brought to the attention of Congress prior to the passage of the DMCA.
12. Beyer Sims, supra note 11, at 1911; Riehl, supra note 10, at 1766-68; Strahilevitz,
supra note 11, at 511-12.
13. Riehl, supra note 10, at 1765.
14. Strahilevitz, supra note 11, at 507.
15. Id. at 513.
16. Id. at 515; A&M Records v. Napster, 2001 U.S. Dist. WL227083, at *1-*2 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 5, 2001).
17. Strahilevitz, supra note 11, at 515.
18. See Christopher Stem, Verizon Identifies Download Suspects; Firm Says Fight Goes On
to Guard Privacy, WASH. POST, June 6, 2003, at E5. Although Napster was shut down,
"peer-to-peer software spread across the Internet, making it easier for users to trade songs with
each other directly." Id.; see also A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 284 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir.
2002); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
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to illegal file sharing.' 9
The problem was that even while Napster was still functioning,
peer-to-peer technology had evolved through new software programs, such
as Gnutella, Kazaa, and Morpheus. 20  These programs were true
peer-to-peer networks in that they did "not rely on a central server to store
a directory of the files available on users' systems.' Instead, the
computers that are on the network all "function as mini-servers.
22
Because they are not centralized, these new programs were more difficult
to take offline since there was no central repository that would eliminate
the entire system if removed.23
These new decentralized networks caused the RIAA to re-evaluate its
tactics in fighting online piracy. Instead of just prosecuting the creators of
the file sharing programs, it decided to pursue legal remedies against
individual copyright infringers, primarily focusing on those whom the
RIAA suspected were illegally maintaining over 1000 songs on their
computer hard drives.24 The RIAA's difficulty in pursuing these individual
users was in physically locating them. Using "bot" technology, the RIAA
could obtain the screen name of an individual user and the Internet Protocol
("IP") address associated with that name on its own. 5 But it could not link
the IP address to the individual using the software.26 Consequently, after
obtaining an IP address of a potential infringer, the RIAA needed the
assistance of an ISP to determine the name and physical address associated
with the IP address in its possession.
II. THE DMCA AND SECTION 512(H) SUBPOENAS
The DMCA, passed by Congress, was "designed to facilitate the
robust development and world-wide expansion of electronic commerce,
19. Jonathan Krim, File Sharing Forfeits Right to Privacy; Judge Tells Verizon To Identify
Customer, WASH. POST, April 25, 2003, at El (stating that "[t]he recording industry estimates
that it lost $5 billion worldwide last year as a result of people sharing music files.").
20. See Strahilevitz, supra note 11, at 515-22; Riehl, supra note 10, at 1773-79.
21. Strahilevitz, supra note 11, at 517.
22. Id.
23. Id.; Beyer Sims, supra note 11, at 1911.
24. See Musgrove, R!AA Plans, supra note 2, at El; see also Frank Ahrens, Music Industry
Will Talk Before Suing; Trade Group Tells Senate It Wants to Be 'Reasonable' With Song
Swappers, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 2003, at El.
25. Jonathan Krim, A Story of Piracy and Privacy, WASH. POST, Sept. 5, 2002, at El.
"Bots," short for "robots," are automated software agents that identify computers with music that
can be downloaded through peer-to-peer file sharing. Id.
26. Id.; Verizon III, 351 F.3d 1229, 1232 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
27. Verizon III, 351 F.3d at 1232.
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communications, research, development, and education in the digital
age."28  It was an attempt to adapt the law to account for changes in
technology and "to make digital networks safe places to disseminate and
exploit copyrighted materials," particularly "the movies, music, software,
and literary works that are the fruit of American creative genius. ' '29
One of the main concerns in formulating the DMCA was to balance
the competing interests of copyright owners and ISPs. Copyright owners
wanted assurances that copyrighted material placed online would not be
subject to mass piracy.3" In contrast, ISPs were concerned about their
potential liability from lawsuits by copyright holders based on online
infringement by third parties.3" Congress reached a compromise between
these two interests that was incorporated into 17 U.S.C. § 512.32
Under section 512, ISPs have a number of safe harbors that protect
them from monetary liability as long as the ISP did not have actual
knowledge that they were facilitating the spread of infringing material.33
This includes situations where the ISP was transmitting, caching, or storing
material as well as situations where an ISP's information location tools
were used to locate infringing material.34 In exchange for these safe
harbors, ISPs were required to assist copyright holders in finding
infringers. For instance, if a copyright owner properly notifies an ISP that
its network contains infringing material, the ISP must expeditiously act to
take down the infringing material. 35  Another example of this required
assistance is the subpoena power provided to copyright owners by section
512(h).36
Under Section 512(h), a copyright owner may request that the clerk of
any federal district court issue a subpoena to a service provider in order to
identify an alleged infringer.37 To validly request a subpoena, the
28. SEN. REP. No. 105-190, at 1-2 (1998).
29. Id. at 2.
30. Id. at 8 (claiming that "[d]ue to the ease with which digital works can be copied and
distributed worldwide virtually instantaneously, copyright owners will hesitate to make their
works readily available on the Internet without reasonable assurance that they will be protected
against massive piracy.").
31. Id. (suggesting that "[a]t the same time, without clarification of their liability, service
providers may hesitate to make the necessary investment in the expansion of the speed and
capacity of the Internet.").
32. See id. at 9; 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2000).
33. 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)-(d) (detailing limitations on liability relating to online material).
34. Id.
35. Id. §§ 512(b)(2)(E), (c)(1)(A)(iii), (d)(3).
36. Id. § 512(h).
37. Id. § 512(h)(1) (stating that "[a] copyright owner or a person authorized to act on the
owner's behalf may request the clerk of any United States district court to issue a subpoena to a
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copyright owner must file three documents with the clerk of court: (1) a
copy of a notification described in 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A); (2) a proposed
subpoena; and (3) a sworn declaration that the purpose of the subpoena is
to obtain the identity of an alleged infringer and that the information will
only be used for the purpose of copyright protection.38 Under section
512(c)(3)(A), a notification of claimed infringemeit must be a written
communication provided to the designated agent of a service provider,
which substantially includes the following: (1) the copyright owner's
signature; (2) identification of the copyrighted work that has allegedly been
infringed; (3) "[i]dentification of the material that is claiming to be
infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity and that is to be
removed or access to which is to be disabled, and information reasonably
sufficient to permit the service provider to locate the material"; (4)
information reasonably sufficient to allow the service provider to contact
the complaining party; (5) a statement of good faith belief that the material
complained of is not authorized by copyright law; and (6) a statement
under penalty of perjury that notification is accurate and that the
complaining party is authorized to act on behalf of the copyright owner.39
The proposed subpoena shall order the service provider to disclose to the
copyright owner information sufficient to identify the alleged infringer to
the extent such information is available.40
If the three documents described above are in proper form, then the
clerk shall issue and sign the proposed subpoena and return it to the
copyright owner for delivery.4' After the service provider receives the
subpoena and the section 512(c)(3)(A) notification, it shall disclose the
information required by the subpoena.42 To the extent that section 512(h)
fails to provide an answer, the general subpoena duces tecum rules of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will govem the issuance of these
service provider for identification of an alleged infringer in accordance with this subsection.").
38. Id. § 512(h)(2).
39. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A).
40. Id. § 512(h)(3) (stating that "[tihe subpoena shall authorize and order the service
provider receiving the notification and the subpoena to expeditiously disclose to the copyright
owner... information sufficient to identify the alleged infringer of the material described in the
notification to the extent such information is available to the service provider.").
41. See id. § 512(h)(4) (stating that "[i]f the notification filed satisfies the provisions of
subsection (c)(3)(A), the proposed subpoena is in proper form, and the accompanying declaration
is properly executed, the clerk shall expeditiously issue and sign the proposed subpoena and
return it to the requester for delivery to the service provider.").
42. Id. § 512(h)(5) (stating that "[u]pon receipt of the issued subpoena, either accompanying
or subsequent to the receipt of a notification described in subsection (c)(3)(A), the service
provider shall expeditiously disclose to the copyright owner... the information required by the
subpoena").
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subpoenas.43
Section 512(h) was convenient because it allowed the RIAA to
subpoena the required information prior to filing suit and then decide later
whether to initiate litigation. To request a subpoena, a copyright owner
only had to pay $35 and make sure the paperwork was properly filed."
The RIAA took full advantage of this power when it decided to pursue
individual users for copyright infringement. Although the RIAA has not
confirmed how many subpoenas it has requested, some estimate that the
RIAA made between 1500 and 4000 requests.
45
III. THE VERIZON SUBPOENAS
Many ISPs complied with the subpoena requests, providing the names
and addresses requested.46 With this information, the RIAA filed suit
against 382 individuals and sent warnings to 398 others.47 As a result of
these suits, the RIAA settled with 220 defendants and has been able to
prompt over 1000 people to sign "amnesty letters" in which the RIAA
agreed not to pursue litigation if the infringers erased their music files and
promised not to illegally download copyrighted music in the future.4 8
Additionally, the lawsuits reportedly caused many computer users to delete
music files from their computers and refrain from using peer-to-peer
services.49
But not all the ISPs complied with the subpoena requests. Verizon
Internet Services, Inc. refused to comply with two section 512(h)
subpoenas filed by the RIAA.5° Verizon maintained that because it merely
43. Id. § 512(h)(6); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 34, 37, 45.
44. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(h)(4); Frank Ahrens, A Reprise of Lawsuits Over Piracy; Music
Industry Lacks Defendants'Names, WASH. POST, Jan 22, 2004, at El.
45. See Frank Ahrens, Use of Subpoenas to Name File Sharers Criticized, WASH. POST,
Sept. 30, 2003, at E5; Krim & Ahrens, supra note 3, at Al.
46. Krim, A Story of Piracy and Privacy, supra note 25, at El ("[T]he RIAA said that until
Verizon's refusal to honor the subpoena, many Internet service providers had given the identities
of individuals accused of copyright violations.").
47. See Krim & Ahrens, supra note 3, at Al.
48. Id.
49. Musgrove, supra note 6, at F7 (discussing a report by research firm NPD Group Inc.,
which found that in August 2003, 1.4 million households deleted the digital music files on their
computer hard drives and that the number of households acquiring music from peer-to-peer
technology declined 11% in that month).
50. 351 F.3d 1229, 1233 (D.C. Cir. 2003) ("Verizon I11P). The first RIAA subpoena was
served on Verizon on July 24, 2002, and is the subpoena at issue in In re: Verizon Internet Servs.,
Inc., 240 F. Supp. 2d 24 (D.D.C. 2003) ("Verizon I'). Verizon only challenged this subpoena on
statutory grounds, which the district court rejected. Verizon I at 41-42. The second RIAA
subpoena was served on Verizon on February 4, 2003, after the district court's decision in
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acted as a conduit for those allegedly infringing upon copyrighted
materials, section 512(h) did not require it to provide the RIAA with the
names and addresses of its customers. 51 Rather, it contended that it was
only required to comply with that provision if it was storing material that
infringed on copyrights.52 Accordingly, it refused to provide the names and
addresses behind the IP addresses that were the basis of the RIAA's
subpoena.53
A. In Re: Verizon Internet Services, Inc.
In response, the RIAA filed a motion to enforce the first subpoena
issued to Verizon in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia where it had originally filed the subpoena request. 54 It asserted
that section 512(h) applied to all ISPs, regardless of the services the ISPs
provided the alleged infringers. 55 The RIAA maintained that this was part
of the balance struck between copyright owners and ISPs when formulating
the DMCA 6 In addition to the RIAA, the Motion Picture Association of
America ("MPAA"), a number of Internet industry associations, and
Internet privacy advocates, such as the Electronic Frontier Foundation
("EFF"), filed amicus briefs, with the MPAA supporting the enforcement
of the subpoena and the others challenging it. 57 After a one-day hearing,
the district court held in favor of the RIAA, finding that the statutory
language, the statutory structure, and the purpose and legislative history of
the DMCA compelled enforcement of the subpoena.58
With regard to its statutory interpretation of section 512(h), the
district court initially focused on the definition of "service provider" in
section 512(k).59 In section 512 (with the exception of 512(a)), the term
Verizon I In re: Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 257 F. Supp. 2d 244, 248 (D.D.C. 2003) ("Verizon
If'). Verizon challenged this subpoena on constitutional grounds, contending that all of section
512(h) was unconstitutional because it violated both Article III of the United States Constitution
and the First Amendment. Id. at 246-47. The district court also rejected these arguments. Id. at
247. The D.C. Circuit consolidated both challenges on appeal, but only addressed the statutory
basis for Verizon's refusal to comply. Verizon I1, 351 F.3d at 1231-33. Whether section 512(h)
is constitutional is beyond the scope of this Article.
51. See Verizon I, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 28-29.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 26.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 36-38.
57. Verizon I, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 25-26.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 30-32.
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"service provider" is defined as "a provider of online services or network
access, or the operator of facilities therefor, and includes an entity
described in subparagraph (A).",60 Subparagraph (A) of section 512(k)(1)
provides that "the term 'service provider' means an entity offering the
transmission, routing, or providing of connections for digital online
communications, between or among points specified by a user, of material
of the user's choosing, without modification to the content of the material
as sent or received.",61  The district court noted that the definition in
subparagraph (A) describes Verizon's role as a service provider.62 Further,
the district court noted that the term "service provider" is used throughout
section 512(h).6 3 Therefore, the district court concluded that section 512(h)
contemplated requiring all ISPs, including those that merely transmit
material, to comply with its subpoena provisions.64
Next, the district court considered whether a copyright owner could
satisfy the notification requirements of section 512(c)(3)(A) if the ISP only
passively transmitted information. 65  Verizon had argued that subpoena
authority only extended to claims under section 512(c), which covers
situations where infringing material is stored by an ISP, because only
section 512(c) is referenced in section 512(h).6 6 It also claimed that a
copyright owner could not properly file a subpoena request involving
passive transmissions of material because it could not comply with the
notification requirements of section 512(c)(3)(A).67  Section
512(c)(3)(A)(iii) required the copyright owner to identify the infringing
material "that is to be removed or access to which is to be disabled," when
notifying an ISP of infringing activity.68 Verizon maintained that this was
impossible because in order to remove the material, the material must be
stored on the system.69
The court rejected both of Verizon's arguments.70 It first reiterated its
earlier observation that all ISPs, including passive transmitters, were
60. 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(B) (2000).
61. Id. § 512(k)(1)(A).
62. Verizon 1, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 31.
63. Id. at 30 (noting four circumstances within section 512(h) where the term "service
provider" is used); see also 17 U.S.C. §512(h)(1), (3)-(5).
64. Verizon I, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 32.
65. Id. at 32-34.
66. Id. at 32-33; see 17 U.S.C. § 512(h)(2)(A), (4), (5) (referencing § 512(c)(3)(A)).
67. Verizon I, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 33 n.5.
68. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(iii).
69. Verizon I, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 33 n.5.
70. Id. at 32-34.
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covered by section 512(h).7' It then noted that sections 512(b) and (d) also
had notification requirements that referenced section 512(c)(3)(A).72
Therefore, the subpoena provision had to cover more than just section
512(c) situations.1 Further, the court found that neither the title to section
512(h) nor the language in the provision provided any indication that
Congress intended to prevent copyright owners from using these subpoenas
when the ISP did not store any information on its network.74
Next, the court rejected Verizon's argument that a copyright owner
could not comply with the section 512(c)(3)(A) notification requirements.75
The court stated that section 512(c)(3)(A)(iii) only requires the copyright
owner to identify the infringing material to be removed, not that the
material actually be removed.76 The district court also noted that even if
the infringing material had to be removed or disabled, an ISP can do so by
terminating the alleged violator's Internet account. 7 In fact, the district
court noted that section 512 contemplates that ISPs implement policies that
in appropriate circumstances provide for termination of the accounts of
repeat infringers. Therefore, the district court concluded, the statutory
language and structure of section 512 compels finding that all ISPs are
subject to section 512(h).
After making this determination, the court confirmed this result by
looking at the purpose and history of the DMCA.79 It noted that in passing
the DMCA, "Congress not only sought to limit the liability of service
providers.., but also intended to assist copyright owners in protecting
their copyrights., 80 Thus, the DMCA was the result of tradeoffs, in which
"service providers would receive liability protections in exchange for
assisting copyright owners in identifying and dealing with infringers who
71. Id. at 32.
72. Id. at 32-33; 17 U.S.C. § 512(b)(2)(E); id. § 512(d)(3).
73. Verizon I, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 32-33.
74. Id. at 33-34.
75. Id. at 33 n.5.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A)). Section 512(i)(1)(A) states:
(1)The limitations on liability established by this section shall apply to a service
provider only if the service provider-
(A)has adopted and reasonably implemented, and informs subscribers and account
holders of the service provider's system or network of, a policy that provides for
the termination in appropriate circumstances of subscribers and account holders of
the service provider's system or network who are repeat infringers.
17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A).
79. Verizon I, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 36-39.
80. Id. at 36.
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misuse the service providers' systems." 81 From a policy standpoint, the
court concluded, there was no basis for making a distinction between ISPs
who passively transmit material and ISPs who store it because the harm to
copyright owners was the same. 82  The widespread use of peer-to-peer
technology, which only requires that ISPs transmit, rather than store,
material, requires the inclusion of all ISPs; any other interpretation of
section 512(h) would fail to effectuate the purposes behind the Act.
83
The court's only hesitation in reaching this result was that the
technologies at issue, peer-to-peer software and "bots," were not used
online at the time of the DMCA's enactment.84  But the district court
decided that this new technology should not upset the careful balance
struck between ISPs and copyright owners with regard to the exchange of
assistance and protection from liability.85 Considering the foregoing, the
district court concluded that based on the language and structure of the
statute, and the purpose and legislative history of the DMCA, section
512(h) necessarily requires all ISPs to comply with its subpoena
86 8provisions. Accordingly, it granted the RIAA's motion to enforce.87
B. RIAA v. Verizon Internet Services, Inc.
Verizon appealed the district court's decision, and the D.C. Circuit
consolidated this case with Verizon's appeal of the second RIAA subpoena,
which concerned the constitutionality of section 512(h).88 Judge Douglas
Ginsburg, writing for a unanimous panel, agreed with the district court's
analysis of the purpose of the DMCA, but concluded that the district court
incorrectly interpreted section 512 with respect to its subpoena
89provisions. Specifically, the panel disagreed with the district court on
three points: (1) whether the definition of "service provider" was
dispositive; (2) whether a copyright owner could comply with the
notification requirements of section 512(c)(3)(A) if the ISP was only
81. Id. at 37.
82. Id. at 35-36.
83. Id. at 38.
84. Id.
85. Verizon I, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 38-39.
86. Id. at 44.
87. Id. at 45. After the district court granted the motion to enforce, Verizon asked for a stay
pending appeal from both the district and appellate courts. Verizon II, 257 F. Supp. 2d 244, 268
(D.D.C. 2003); Stem, supra note 18, at E5. The stay was denied, and on June 5, 2003, Verizon
provided the name and physical addresses of the customers that were the basis of the contested
subpoena. Stem, supra note 18, at E5.
88. Verizon I1, 351 F.3d 1229, 1233 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
89. See id. at 1238-39.
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passively transmitting material; and (3) whether terminating Internet
accounts was an available enforcement mechanism to remove or disable
access to infringing material. 90 Additionally, the panel reviewed the
legislative history and purpose behind the DMCA.91 After its review, the
panel concluded that ISPs are only required to comply with section 512(h)
subpoenas if they are caching materials, storing materials, or providing
information tools to link to infringing materials. 92 Consequently, the panel
vacated the district court's decision enforcing the subpoena because
Verizon was not performing any of these tasks.93
In its analysis, the panel vehemently disagreed with the district
court's emphasis on the definition of "service provider" under section
512. 94 The panel concluded that regardless of how broadly the term was
defined, it is irrelevant with respect to whether a copyright owner can
comply with the requirements of section 512(h).95 Therefore, although an
ISP that only transmits material could possibly be covered by section
512(h), the ISP will not be required to comply with that section unless the
copyright owner can satisfy that section's requirements.96
The panel then challenged the district court's conclusion that a
copyright owner could satisfy the notification requirements of section
512(c)(3)(A).97 Whereas the district court found that the requirement the
copyright owner identify the infringing material "that is to be removed or
access to which is disabled" was not problematic, the panel disagreed.
98
Instead, it held that because there is no material for an ISP to remove or to
which to disable access, a copyright owner cannot possibly identify such
material.99 And even though section 512(c)(3)(A) only requires substantial
compliance with the notification requirements, the failure to identify
material to be removed was substantial.100 Therefore, when an ISP was
90. See id. at 1234-37.
91. Id. at 1238-39.
92. See id. at 1234-35, 1237.
93. Id. at 1239.
94. Verizon III, 351 F.3d. at 1236; 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(B); see also supra text
accompanying notes 59-64.
95. Verizon III, 351 F.3d at 1236. The court stated "however broadly '[internet] service
provider' is defined in § 512(k)(1)(B), a subpoena may issue to an ISP only under the prescribed
conditions regarding notification. Define all the world as an ISP if you like, the validity of a
§ 512(h) subpoena still depends upon the copyright holder having given the ISP, however
defined, a notification effective under § 512(c)(3)(A)." Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1234-36.
98. Verizon III, 351 F.3d at 1234-36; see also supra text accompanying notes 75-78.
99. Verizon I1, 351 F.3d at 1235.
100. Id. at 1235-36.
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merely transmitting material, a copyright owner could not satisfy the
requirements of section 512(c)(3)(A), and thus section 512(h).
0'
The panel also rejected the argument that an ISP could disable access
to the material by terminating the alleged infringer's Internet 
account.' 02
The appellate court stated that disabling access to material and terminating
an account were two distinct remedies under the DMCA. 10 3 Because the
requirements of section 512(c)(3)(A) only discussed disabling access to
material, this provision could not imply that the notification requirements
could be satisfied by terminating accounts. 1°4
After concluding that the statutory language required excluding ISPs
that merely transmitted material, the panel reviewed the legislative history
and the purpose of the DMCA. 10 5 In reviewing this material, the panel
agreed with the district court that the purpose of the DMCA was to balance
copyright protection for copyright owners with the need to shield ISPs from
liability for the copyright infringement of others.10 6  But it noted that
because peer-to-peer technology had not been available when the DMCA
legislation was passed, Congress could not have contemplated that the
infringing material would be stored on personal computers, rather than the
Internet. 10 7 At the time of passage, Congress was concerned with bulletin
board services ("BBSs") and file transfer protocol ("FTP") sites, both of
which involved storing material on the Internet, rather than accessing
material stored on an individual's hard drive.'0 8 The fact that Congress did
not contemplate the advent of peer-to-peer technology and did not draft the
statute broad enough to encompass subpoena power for these situations
meant that the language of section 512(h) must control, even if that is not
101. Id. at 1236 (stating that "[i]n sum, we agree with Verizon that § 512(h) does not by its
terms authorize the subpoenas issued here. A § 512(h) subpoena simply cannot meet the notice
requirement of § 512(c)(3)(A)(iii).").
102. Id. at 1235.
103. Id. Section 5120)(1) provides the scope of injunctive relief that a copyright owner may
employ against an ISP. 17 U.S.C. § 5120)(1). One remedy is to restrain an ISP "from providing
access to infringing material or activity residing at a particular online site on the provider's
system or network." Id. § 512(j)(1)(A)(i). Another is to restrain an ISP "from providing access
to a subscriber or account holder of the service provider's system or network who is engaging in
infringing activity ... by terminating the accounts of the subscriber or account holder[.]" Id.
§ 512(j)(1)(A)(ii).
104. Verizon III, 351 F.3d at 1235 (citing Transbrasil S.A. Linhas Aereas v. Dep't of Trans.,
791 F.2d 202, 205 (D.C. Cir. 1986)).
105. Id. at 1237-39.
106. Id. at 1238-39.
107. Id. at 1238. Although not technically correct, it is true that peer-to-peer technology
was not widely available until after Congress passed the DMCA. See Beyer Sims, supra note 11,
at 1910.
108. Id. at 1237.
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what Congress intended.'0 9 Therefore, the panel concluded that Verizon
was not required to comply with the RIAA's subpoenas because it merely
transmitted infringing material, and passive transmitters of infringing
material are not covered by section 512(h). 11
0
The D.C. Circuit decision was correct. Congress did not intend for
ISPs to assist copyright owners when the ISP was merely transmitting
material. That is why section 512(a), unlike sections 512(b)-(d), does not
contain a provision that requires an ISP to act upon notice of
infringement."' If Congress did so intend, it could have easily required
ISPs to disable the Internet accounts of illegal downloaders, which,
although a separate remedy, is not necessarily harsher than removing stored
information. Further, it is clear that the reason Congress chose not to
require ISP action in these situations was because the threat of peer-to-peer
technology had not yet crystallized in 1998 when the DMCA was passed.
Therefore, the statute Congress passed treated transmitted material
differently from stored material, and the D.C. Circuit correctly concluded
that this distinction prevented copyright owners from enforcing section
512(h) in passive transmittal situations.
IV. EFFECTS OF THE VERIZON DECISION
Assuming other federal appellate courts agree with the D.C. Circuit's
decision, where does this leave copyright owners in the battle against
individual users in the war on online piracy? Copyright owners appear to
have two options: they can seek to have section 512(h) amended to include
ISPs serving as passive transmitters, or they can file "John Doe" lawsuits
and send a third-party subpoena to an ISP for the same information.
Although the helpfulness of the legislative option is uncertain, the "John
Doe" subpoenas give copyright owners rights similar to section 512(h)
subpoenas.
Through legislative change, copyright owners could try to amend
section 512(h) to expressly include section 512(a) situations where an ISP
is passively transmitting infringing material between two users. To do this,
Congress could pursue two different paths. First, it could change section
512(h) to note that section 512(a) situations do not have to meet the section
512(c)(3)(A) requirements. This, however, would necessitate a further
revision of section 512(h) for transmittal situations to require a copyright
owner to identify the IP address, the material that is being infringed, and
109. Id. at 1238.
110. Verizon Il, 351 F.3d at 1239.
111. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 512(a), with § 512(b)-(d).
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the material that is infringing. The section 512(c)(3)(A) notification
requirements currently provide this information, which is necessary for
ISPs to determine the customer the copyright owner seeks and to make a
cursory assessment as to whether the subpoena was submitted in good
faith.112 Second, Congress could state in section 512(h) that section 512(a)
situations have to meet the notification requirements of section
512(c)(3)(A), with the exception of section (c)(3)(A)(iii). But in that case,
section 512(a) would have to be revised to require a copyright owner to
provide notification, as it is currently not required to do So.113
Regardless of the method for revising section 512(h), it is not a
foregone conclusion that change is imminent. Senator Orrin Hatch has said
that he would seek to streamline the subpoena process after learning of the
D.C. Circuit's decision.'1 14 But there has been some concern about the mass
use of these subpoenas against individual users. In fact, on September 30,
2003, the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, chaired by
Senator Norm Coleman, held a hearing to discuss these concerns. 115
Senator Coleman is on record as saying that "there has got to be a better
way" than mass suing computer users in order to protect copyrights.
116
Thus, there are political hurdles that copyright owners must overcome
before Congress can pass such legislation.
In the meantime, the RIAA has decided to use "John Doe" lawsuits to
obtain the names and addresses of individual users accused of illegally
downloading music. On January 21, 2004, the RIAA filed a number of
"John Doe" lawsuits in order to obtain the names and addresses of 532
computer users. 117 With these suits, a copyright owner can subpoena an
ISP for the names and addresses of those IP addresses that are the nominal
basis for the suit.118 The ISP can then either comply with the subpoena or
contact its customer to see if the customer wants to challenge the validity of
the subpoena. Unless there is a successful challenge, the copyright owner
will receive the names and addresses and proceed with litigation
substituting the customer's name for that of the IP address.
In practicality, the "John Doe" lawsuit will not be much more
112. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A).
113. See id. § 512(a).
114. Krim & Ahrens, supra note 3, at Al.
115. Ahrens, Use of Subpoenas, supra note 45, at E5; Privacy And Piracy: The Paradox of
Illegal File Sharing on Peer-to-Peer Networks and the Impact of Technology on the
Entertainment Industry: Hearing Before the Perm. Subcomm. on Investigations of the Senate
Comm. on Gov. Affairs, 108th Cong. 4-6 (2003) (opening statement of Sen. Coleman).
116. Ahrens, Use of Subpoenas, supra note 45, at E5.
117. Ahrens, A Reprise of Lawsuits, supra note 44, at El.
118. Id.
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expensive or time consuming than section 512(h) subpoenas. The
costliness of these lawsuits has been somewhat ameliorated by the bundling
of suits for each different service provider, which the RIAA has already
begun to do.'1 9 With bundling, all of the IP addresses associated with one
ISP are sued in one suit. In addition, filing suit will not be time-consuming
unless the customer challenges the subpoena. However, the customer will
not have many valid arguments against the subpoena, as the broad rules of
discovery allow the disclosure of almost all relevant information, and the
name and the location of a defendant is certainly relevant.120
In conclusion, even without legislative change, the D.C. Circuit
decision should not have a drastic long-term effect on the RIAA's crusade
against online piracy. However, to the extent that online piracy is
committed primarily through peer-to-peer technology, the subpoena power
granted to copyright owners under section 512(h) of the DMCA has now
been rendered obsolete.
119. Id. The RIAA filed only four "John Doe" suits in suing 532 individuals. Id.
120. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26. ("Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged,
that is relevant to the claim or defense of any party, including... the identity and location of
persons having knowledge of discoverable matter.").
